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Typing Culture with Keyboard: Okinawa - Reviving the Japanese Ryukyu-Language through the Art and Precision of Digital Input (38c3)
In a world dominated by digital communication and the drive toward linguistic unification, the simple act of 'typing' varies significantly across languages and writing systems. For European languages like English and German, typing typically involves a set of about 100 letters and symbols. In contrast, Japanese—and by extension, Okinawan—requires three distinct scripts: hiragana, katakana, and kanji. Each of these adds layers of complexity and cultural depth to written expression. This presentation delves into the development of an input method engine (IME) for Okinawan, an endangered language spoken in Japan's Ryukyuan archipelago. Moving beyond technical challenges,...
Clay PCB (38c3)
We built an Ethical Hardware Kit with a PCB microcontroller made of wild clay retrieved from the forest in Austria and fired on a bonfire. Our conductive tracks use urban-mined silver and all components are re-used from old electronic devices. The microcontroller can compute different inputs and outputs and is totally open source. It is an open secret that the hardware in our smart devices contains not only plastics but also ‘conflict minerals’ such as copper and gold. Technology is not neutral. We investigate alternative hardware from locally sourced materials from a feminist perspective, to...
„Konnte bisher noch nie gehackt werden“: Die elektronische Patientenakte kommt - jetzt für alle! (38c3)
In wenigen Wochen werden die Gesundheitsdaten von rund 73 Millionen in Deutschland Krankenversicherten ohne deren Zutun über Praxis- und Krankenhausgrenzen hinweg zentral in einer Akte zusammengeführt - in der [„elektronischen Patientenakte für alle“](https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/themen/digitalisierung/elektronische-patientenakte/epa-fuer-alle.html). Fortsetzung von 36C3 - [„Hacker hin oder her“: Die elektronische Patientenakte kommt!](https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10595-hacker_hin_oder_her_die_elektronische_patientenakte_kommt) In wenigen Wochen startet die [„elektronische Patientenakte (ePA) für alle“](https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/themen/digitalisierung/elektronische-patientenakte/epa-fuer-alle.html): Medizinische Befunde, Medikationslisten und weitere Gesundheitsdaten von rund 73 Millionen in Deutschlang Krankenversicherten werden dann ohne deren Zutun über Praxis- und Krankenhausgrenzen hinweg in einer zentralen Akte zusammengeführt. Bisher musste die ePA explizit beantragt werden. Ab Januar 2025 dagegen erhalten alle gesetzlich...
libobscura: Cameras are difficult (38c3)
I'm not big-brained enough to use cameras on Linux, so I decided to write my own camera stack (based on a real story). The libobscura experiment exists to find out what a point-and-shoot API abstracting Video4Linux should look like. It has its roots on one hand in the Librem 5 project, where I wrote some 70% of the camera stack, and on the other hand in libcamera, which I found too difficult to use. You think controlling a modern camera is easy? Think again. Between pixel formats, depths, media entities, pads and links, sensitivity, denoising, phase...
ACE up the sleeve: (38c3)
With the iPhone 15 & iPhone 15 Pro, Apple switched their iPhone to USB-C and introduced a new USB-C controller: The ACE3, a powerful, very custom, TI manufactured chip. But the ACE3 does more than just handle USB power delivery: It's a full microcontroller running a full USB stack connected to some of the internal busses of the device, and is responsible for providing access to JTAG of the application processor, the internal SPMI bus, etc. We start by investigating the previous variant of the ACE3: The ACE2. It's based on a known chip, and using...
How Roaming Agreements Enable 5G MitM Attacks (38c3)
End-users in cellular networks are at risk of connecting to fake base stations, and we show that mitigations pushed in 5G are insufficient. Machine-in-the-Middle (MitM) attackers aim to overhear and manipulate network traffic. The MitM position can also be used as an entry point for baseband exploitation. Proceeding from there, attackers can gain full control of a user’s phone. Standardization bodies pushed many mitigations against MitM into the specification of cellular networks. However, roaming agreements still enable powerful attackers to perform seamless attacks – even in 5G! In this talk, you’ll learn about the complex nature...
We've not been trained for this: life after the Newag DRM disclosure (38c3)
You've probably already heard the story: we got contracted to analyze a bunch of trains breaking down after being serviced by independent workshops. We reverse engineered them and found code which simulated failures when they detected servicing attempts. We presented our findings at 37C3… and then shit hit the fan. This talk will be an update about what happened since our 37C3 presentation. We’ll talk about: - Three parliamentary workgroup sessions with dirty bathroom photos on Newag’s offtopic slides, train operators revealing that they paid Newag more than 20k EUR for unlocking a single train, which...
Breaking NATO Radio Encryption (38c3)
We present fatal security flaws in the HALFLOOP-24 encryption algorithm, which is used by the US military and NATO. HALFLOOP-24 was meant to safeguard the automatic link establishment protocol in high frequency radio, but our research demonstrates that merely two hours of intercepted radio traffic are sufficient to recover the secret key. In the talk, we start with the fundamentals of symmetric key cryptography before going into the details of high frequency radio, HALFLOOP-24, and the foundation of our attack. High frequency (HF) radio, also known as shortwave radio, is commonly used by the military,...
Building Your First LoRa Mesh Network From Scratch (38c3)
In a world of centralized internet control, building your own mesh network isn't just a technical challenge—it's digital independence. This beginner-friendly guide walks through creating resilient mesh networks using accessible hardware like LoRa and ESP devices. From antenna selection to node placement strategy, learn how to build networks that operate independently of traditional infrastructure. Ever wondered how to create your own independent communication network? This practical introduction demonstrates how to build resilient mesh networks using affordable, readily available components. We'll demystify the process while emphasizing legal and responsible deployment. The talk breaks down into four key...
CTF: WTF?! - Capture The Flag für Einsteiger (38c3)
Capture The Flag (CTF) für Einsteiger: Wie man legal "hacken" ueben kann, warum man das tun sollte und wo man anfaengt. "Hacken" ist längst nicht mehr nur Hobby. WTF? CTF! Was ist ein "Capture The Flag", wie passt das in die aktuelle Menge aus Security Buzzwords, welchen Nutzen kann ich daraus ziehen und wie fange ich an? Es werden ein paar einfache Plattformen und Veranstaltungen zum starten und üben gezeigt. Dem folgen Spielarten, Wege "hacken" zu lernen, und ein Ausblick auf berufliche Möglichkeiten. Der Vortrag richtet sich an Einsteiger die neue Herausforderungen suchen und ihr Wissen...